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We print this month the opinion of Judge RITCHIE, of the

Superior Court of Baltimore, referred to last month, in which
Carriers,

he holds that the purchaser of a section in a Pull-

Passengers,

man sleeping car for a given trip has the right,
on .leaving the train before he reaches his destination, to transfer the use of his section to another
first-class passenger, for the rest of the trip for

Plman
Sleeper,
Transfer of

Ticket

which it was sold.
"This suit is brought to recover damages for having been
ejected from a certain section in one of the defendant's sleeping cars. So far as it is necessary for me to refer to the facts
in the case, they are as follows: On the 3oth of September,
1893, Mr. Curlander and his wife, the plaintiffs, left Baltimore
upon the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad for Chicago; on the
same day some gentleman and his wife, whose names are not
known, but whom I will designate as Mr. and Mrs. "X.,"
boarded the same train at Washington for the same city. All
parties were entitled to a first-class passage to Chicago.
"Mr. X. had bought and paid for the use of section number
one on the Pullman Sleeper, "Valley Falls," attached to said
train, from Washington to Chicago, and held a ticket for the
same. The only restriction printed upon this ticket was
"Good for this date and car only when accompanied by a
first-class railroad ticket." During the day the Pullman con709
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ductor took up this ticket and gave Mr. X. in lieu thereof a
check for the use of the section in question. This check
showed on its face the same trip, that is, from Washington to
Chicago, and the only limitation on it touching its use was:
'This check is good for this trip only.' On the evening of
the same day, at Pittsburg, Mr. Curlander bought for himself
and wife the upper berth of section six in the same car and
paid for its use from that point to Chicago. On the next
morning, after the car had been arranged for day travel, it
was found that the seats which went with the upper berth
were those which faced the rear of the car and required the
plaintiffs to ride backwards. After riding a short time in this
position Mrs. Curlander had a severe attack of nausea; observ"ing her sickness Mrs. X. invited her to a seat in her section,
where she rode facing the engine, and was much relieved by
her change of position. Mrs. k. then told her that she and
her husband would soon leave the car, having determined to
get off at Deshler, a station about seven hours distant from
Chicago, and said that her husband would give their section
to Mr. Curlander so that she would not have to ride backwards. On leaving the train at Deshler, Mr. X. accordingly
told Mr. Curlander that he might have his section for the rest
of the trip; and transferred to him the check which he held
for the same. A little further on, at Defiance, the Pullman
conductor, knowing that Mr. and Mrs. X. had left the train,
sold the section over again from that point to Chicago to
parties who boarded the train at that station. Upon bringing
these persons to the section he found it occupied by the plaintiffs. Being requested to vacate and return to their former
seats, Mr. Curlander told the conductor that the section had
been given to him by Mr. X., and showed him the check which
he held therefor, offering to the conductor at the same time
the use of his two seats in section six. An altercation ensued,
the conductor of the train was called in, and while there is
some conflict as to whether the ejection was the act of the
defendant or of the train conductor, the plaintiffs were compelled to vacate the section. Soon after returning to her
former seat, Mrs. Curlander again suffered from severe nausea
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-and continued to do so until she reached Chicago. The plaintiffs remained in Chicago without special incident until October
Ioth, meanwhile, from time to time, visiting the World's Fair,
and on that day Mrs. Curlander was taken with an illness
peculiar to her then condition. She started for home on the
I2th, and, though she had not then entirely recovered, she
seems to have suffered no material after-effects from this sickness. This sickness also is included as an element in the
claim for damages.
"The sleeping car belonged to defendant, and was attached
to this train under contract with the railroad company, the
defendant being entitled to all proceeds from the sale of seats
or berths.
"The important question at the threshold of this case is as
to the right of Mr. X., on leaving the train, to transfer the use
of his section to Mr. Curlander for the rest of the trip to
Chicago. Neither the able counsel nor the court have been
able to find any case in which this question has been passed
on, or any text-book in which the author expresses an opinion
upon it. It is conceded that the ticket for a section on a
sleeping car is transferable by delivery at any time before the
holder enters upon the journey for which it is purchased, but
it is contended that if he once enters upon his trip and leaves
the train before arriving at his destination, he abandons or
forfeits his right in such section for the balance of the trip for
which it was sold.
"If this be so, the passenger having bought and paid for
the use of the section for the whole of the designated trip, the
restriction against the transfer must be found either in the
express terms of the contract, by implication from its terms,
or by construction, from the nature of the contract. There
is no express provision against transfer, and the defendant
contends that the restriction arises from the nature of the contract, and also by implication from some of its terms.
" In the absence of authority upon the direct question as
affected by the nature of the contract, the defendant relies
upon a supposed analogy between the contract of carriage by
a railroad company and a contract for the use of a section on

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

a sleeping car, and invokes the rule of construction which is
applied to the contract of carriage. It is well settled that the
usual contract of carriage from one point to another on the
same road is an entire contract, involving a continuous trip,
though the ticket be silent in this respect, and that when the
passenger has once selected his train and started upon his
journey, he has no right to stop over at an intermediate point
and then resume his journey upon another train on the same
ticket. Such a contract is construed to import a continuous
trip by the same train because of the nature of the undertaking.
The reasons for such construction are fully stated in McClure's
Case, 34 Md. 532, and the numerous other authorities cited
by defendant.
But, assuming the analogy claimed, these
cases would not control the questior here, because in this case
there was no effort made to use this section check on a later
or another train, but only on the trip for which it was issued.
It may be, as defendant contends, that a continuous trip under
a contract of carriage, means a continuous trip by the same
person as well as on the same train, though I intimate no
opinion on that point, but while there are two cases submitted
by defendant, in which the courts say obiter, that such is the
law, they, and all others, were cases in which the original
holder or assignee of a partly used railroad ticket, good only
for a continuous trip, attempted to use it on another train.
Some of the reasons given why the same holder cannot resume
his journey on another train might apply to the case of the
use of the ticket by another person on the same train, while
others would not.
" But assuming that the railroad contract of carriage means
a continuous trip by the same person, and on the same train,
is there anything in the nature of the contract for the use of a
section on .asleeping car that requires a similar construction ?
The defendant claims that the contracts are analogous, and
should receive a like construction. I do not think so. The
two contracts are essentially different in character; they are
made with different companies, relate to different subjectmatters, and are perfectly distinct in their undertaking. The
contract with the railroad company is a contract to carry; the
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contract with the Pullman Company has nothing to do with
the transportation of the passenger, and has no relation to the
contract of the railroad company further than that the Pullman
ticket, or check, is not good unless accompanied by a firstclass railroad ticket. The contract for the use of a section is
described in the text-books and in the regulations of the company as a contract of sale-a sale of a given "space " in a
designated car. It is a hiring or a quasi lease of the section,
and gives to the passenger the right to the use of the same
with its comforts and conveniences between the points designated on the ticket. This is the right sold and the right paid
for. The Pullman Company has no active service to perform
under its contract with the passenger; it has only to permit
him, without interference, to have the use of the section it has
sold him. So far as it does in fact carry the passenger in one
of its cars, that is a matter of contract between it and the
railroad company, with which alone the contract of carriage is
made. The railroad company will carry him in one of its own
coaches; or if he contracts with the Pullman Company for the
use of a section, the railroad company provides for his transportation in a Pullman car by its contract with the Pullman
Company. The distinct character of the contract made by the
passenger with each company is shown in Urick's Case, io8
N. Y. 8o.
"When the passenger has selected his train and has called
on the railroad company to perform its contract and carry him
to his destination, and the company tenders itself ready to
perform, and furnishes the necessary means and accommodations, there is good reason why he should not be permitted to
stop off at one or more intermediate stations, and afterwards
resume his journey on the same ticket. Under the contract
of carriage, the railroad company must furnish accommodations and has active services to perform, and when it has once
responded to the demand of the passenger and has partly performed its duty and stands ready to perform the rest, it would
be unreasonable to require it to stand ready again and again
to respond to the call of the passenger according as he may
please to break his journey. Further reasons stated in the
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authorities why the railroad contract is construed to mean a
continuous trip by the same train are that, the contrary doctrine would impose on the carrier additional duties, the removal
of the passenger and his baggage from one train to another,
an increased risk of accidents, and a hindrance and delay not
contemplated. It is contended that the same reasons, or
some of them, prevent the passenger when leaving the train
from making a valid transfer of his railroad ticket to some one
else for the rest of the trip; and further, that the same considerations require a similar construction of the contract made
with the Pullman Company. But from the different nature of
the contracts, none of these reasons apply in the case of the
sale of a section in a sleeping car, and they do not require that
a continuous trip under the Pullman contract should be construed to mean a continuous trip by the same person. The
contract being for the use of a given section on a given train,
necessarily imports a continuous trip by that train, and the
Pullman Company needs no protection against a demand for
the use of the same section on the same ticket on a later day;
no additional duties are imposed on the Pullman Company by
allowing the transfer of his section for the rest of the trip by a
passenger who leaves the train; it is not subjected thereby to
any additional risks, nor to any hindrance or delay; it handles no baggage, no additional attentions are required, and it
makes no difference whether the porter makes up the berth
and dusts off the seat for one passenger or another. The
company sells the use of its section, with the right to some
trifling services from its porter, from one point to another, and
is paid in full for the same; it can make no possible difference
to it whether the section is occupied by one first-class passenger or another, and whoever may hold it, the company can be
called upon to do or furnish nothing that it has not agreed to
and been paid for. If the holder leaves the train without
transferring his section, it might be inferred that he had abandoned it to the company and it might be resold, but when the
company undertakes to sell again what it has already once
sold and been paid for, it does so at the risk of trespassing
upon the rights of others.
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"It is held in Searle's Case, 45 Fed. Rep. 330, that the purchaser of a section may share its use with any proper persons
whom he invites into it; this is because he has purchased the
use of the whole section, and as he can bestow on others the
right to use part of it while he is there, I can see no reason
why he cannot confer upon them the right to continue the use
of it when he leaves the train before the end of the trip for
which it has been sold. It is also conceded, as I have said,
that the purchaser may transfer his section before he enters
upon his journey. I can see no reason why it should become
absolutely non-transferable the moment after he starts. I can
see no reason why he cannot transfer it immediately after starting, if he chooses to ride in a passenger coach; or why two
passengers might not exchange sections; or why, after having
gone half of his journey, the holder might not then trafisfer
his section for the balance of his trip, and himself withdraw
into a passenger coach. It is conceded that he can make such
transfers as long as he remains on the train, provided he gives
notice to the conductor and gets his assent. But the assent of
the defendant to such transfers is not necessary, because there
is no condition in the contract which requires it. If the holder
of the section, after having gone part of his journey, can transfer it to another for the rest of the trip, he himself continuing
on the train but riding in a passenger coach, as I think he can
do, he can make a valid transfer on leaving the train, because
it makes no difference to the Pullman Company, which has
nothing to do with his contract of transportation, whether he
withdraws into a passenger coach or leaves the train.
" It is further contended that the condition on the ticket that
it is good 'only when accompanied by a first-class railroad
ticket,' and the limitation on the conductor's check that it is
'good for this trip only,' and the fact that the through rate
from Washington to Chicago is less than the aggregate rate
of a section from Washington to Deshler and then from Deshler to Chicago, imply a restriction against transfer after the
holder has once started. I cannot accept this view. The
condition on the ticket is simply a designation of the class of
persons who alone are entitled to avail themselves of the con-
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ven:ences of the sleeping car; it would prevent the transfer of
a section to one who did not hold a first-class railroad ticket,
but the condition rather implies that such cars are open to all
who do have such tickets. 'This trip' means the trip stated
on the face of the check upon which is found the restriction,
that is, from Washington to Chicago. No attempt was made
to use it on any other trip than the trip for which the check
expressly states that it was good. Even if 'this trip' under
the contract of carriage would from its nature be construed to
mean a trip by the same person as well as on the same train,
there is nothing, as I have endeavored to show, which would
require these words to receive the same construction under the
To construe this condition as meaning
contract in question.
' good for this trip only andgood only in the hands of the holder
who starts with it,' would be nothing less than interpolating a
material condition not in the contract.
"There is nothing in the fact of a reduced rate which implies
non-transferability. It may well be that the company prefers
by one transaction to sell a section for a long trip at a reduced
rate rather than chance its sale at higher local rates to several
successive purchasers between intermediate stations. It is settled that the usual return coupons of round-trip excursion
tickets, which are always sold at reduced rates, are transferable: Carsten's Case, 44 Minn. 454; Hoffman's Case, 45
Minn. 53; Sleeper's Case, IOO Pa. 257; and where a through
straight ticket over several roads is sold at a reduced rate, the
passenger at the end of any one road may transfer any remaining coupons: Nichols' Case, 23 Oregon, 123. The condition
on a railroad ticket that in consideration of a reduced rate it
is not transferable is good, but non-transferability will not be
implied from the mere fact of a reduced rate. If the reduced
rate does not affect the right to transfer the railroad ticket,
there is no reason why it should prevent the transfer of the
Pullman ticket.
"It follows from what I have said that, in my judgment, the
transfer of the section in question to Mr. Curlander was valid,
and the ejection of his wife therefrom was wrongful. There
being no restriction upon its transfer in the terms of the con-
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tract, except as against such as are not first-class passengers,
nor in the nature of the contract, or to be implied from any
of its conditions, there certainly are no considerations of public
policy or convenience which call on the court to so construe
the voluntary contracts of this defendant as to enable it, contrary to the wishes of the first purchaser, to sell the same thing
twice."
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court ot
Utah, when a passenger leaves the station to which he has
come as a passenger, to engage in his own affairs,
Assault by
Erploye after his relation as a passenger ceases, and the carrier
EPssage'has is not liable for an assault on him, on the grounds
Ceased

of the company outside the station, committed
afterwards by its section foreman, because of private ill-will,
and not permitted by the company; but when, after being thus
assaulted, the quondam passenger returned to the station, and
was there again assaulted by the section foreman and others, in
the presence of the station agent, to whose orders the foreman
was subject, but who made no earnest effort to protect him,
the company was liable for the last assault: Krantz v. Rio
Grande Western Ry. Co., 41 Pac. Rep. 717.
The Supreme Court of California has lately held, that an
ordinance which makes it unlawful "for any person to have in
his possession, unless it be shown that such
Constitutional
possession is innocent, any lottery ticket, is unconLaw,
stitutional, inasmuch as it places on the person
Invalid
Ordinance

accused of its violation the burden of showing the
innocence of his possession (which would seem to be practically impossible): In re Mong Hane, 41 Pac. Rep. 693.
Upon a trial for larceny the question whether the goods
were taken anino furandi is a question of fact for the jury;
and- therefore it has been held lately by the
Crlminal Law,
Queen's Bench Division, that a conviction was
Larceny,
wrong, on the ground that there had been no
AnImo
Furandl,
Functlon of
Jury

finding by the jury that the prisoner had acted
antio furandi when, at the close of a case in the

quarter sessions, the jury announced that they had not agreed
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upon their verdict, but the chairman, having asked them if they
believed the evidence for the prosecution, and having received
an affirmative answer, directed a verdict of guilty to be
entered: Queen v. Farnborough, [1895] 2 Q. B. 484.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has recently
decided a very interesting point of criminal law, to the effect
that under the code of that state, §§ 3905, 39o6,
Third
Conviction, which provide for sentencing for a life a convict
Life
who has been previously twice sentenced to the
Sentence

penitentiary, no one can be so sentenced unless it
appears that the previous offences for which he has been sentenced were penitentiary offences in themselves when committed, and not merely made so because of repeated convictions and sentences for offences which would otherwise be misdemeanors: Stover v. Commonwealth, 22 S. E. Rep. 874.
Statutes which subject a criminal convicted of a second or
third offence to a severer punishment therefor, are not in
violation of the constitutional provision that no one shall be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offence. The increased
punishment is not inflicted for the first offence, but because of
the criminal's persistence in crime: Pea. v. Martin, 47 Cal.
113; Kelly v. Peo., I15 Ill. 583; Ross's Case, 2 Pick. 165;
Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 158 Mass. 598; S. C., 33 N. E.
Rep. 648; Ingalls v. State, 48 Wis. 647. For the same
reason, they are not open to the objection that they are expost
facto, even when the prior convictions occurred before the
passage of the act imposing the additional penalty: Expqrte
Gutierrcr, 45 Cal. 429; Commonwealth v. Graves, 155 Mass.
163; S. C., 29 N. E. Rep. 579; Blackburn v. State, 50 Ohio
St. 428; S. C., 36 N. E. Rep. 18; Rand v. Commonwealtl,
9 Gratt. (Va.) 738. Such statutes, however, cannot apply to
the case of a conviction for an offence committed after that
for which the prisoner is on trial, but for which he is first
tried: Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 738.
If it is intended to impose upon the criminal the additional
punishment for repeated offences, the indictment must allege
that the defendant had been previously convicted, sentenced,
and imprisoned (once or twice, as the case may be,) in some
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penal institution for felonies, (as such penalties are usually
only p'rescribed for felonies or penitentiary offences,) describing each separately: Tuttle v. Commonwealth, 2 Gray, 505;
Commonwealtl v. Harrington, i3o Mass. 35 ; Sturtevant vCommonwealth, I58 Mass. 598; S. C., 33 N. E. Rep. 648;
Commonwealtt v. Walker, (Mass.) 39 N. E. Rep. 1014; State
v. Austin, 113 Mo. 538; Blackburn v. State, 5o Ohio St.
428; S. C., 36 N. E. Rep. i8.
As a general rule, the courts have no discretion in the
matter of imposing sentence under the habitual criminal acts.
If the indictment alleges and the jury finds the necessary facts,
the court must impose the additional punishment: Combs v.
Commonwealth, (Ky.) 20 S. W. Rep. 268 ; Sturtevant v. Coinmonwealtlt, i58 Mass. 598; S. C., 33 N. E. Rep. 648; Blackburn v. State, 5o Ohio St. 428; S. C., 36 N. E. Rep. i8.
And if the indictment does so allege and the jury does so find,
the additional punishment, if not included in the sentence,
cannot be legally awarded against the convict on an information afterwards filed for that purpose: Plumbly v. Commonwealtl, 2 Metc. 413. It is not necessary, unless required by
statute, that the subsequent conviction or convictions should
be for the same identical offence or character of offence: It is
sufficient if the accused has been convicted of any one of the
offences of the grade named: Kelly v. Peo., II5 Ill. 583.
According to the Supreme Court of Michigan, an act which
prohibits the printing on the official ballot of the name of a
candidate, who receives the nomination of two or
Elections,
Ballots,
more parties, in more than one column, is a valid
Printing

Names of
Candidates

exercise of the power conferred on the legislature
by the Constitution, (Art. 7, § 6), "to pass laws

to preserve the purity of elections and guard against abuses of
the elective franchise": Todd v. Board of Elcction Comrs., 64
N. W. Rep. 496.
The question of the validity of irregularly marked ballots
seems to be one that it is impossible to settle finally. In Vallierv.
Brakke, 64 N. W. Rep. i 8o, the Supreme Court of
Marking
Ballots
South Dakota has recently decided a number of

720
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questions with regard to the validity of ballots cast under the
laws of that state. These are practically the same as have
arisen in most of the other states, but of course depend for their
decision upon the wording of the statute. The relevant part of
this is as follows :
"The voter, after retiring to the booth as provided by section twenty-five of said chapter, may make a cross in a circle
to be printed for that purpose at the head of each ticket, over
the ticket he desires to vote, and if he desires to vote for any
candidate on any other part of the ballot, he may erase the
name of the candidate for that office on his ticket, and place a
cross to the left of the name of such person for whom he
desires to vote, and in case a voter does not wish to vote a
party ticket, he need not cross the circle at the top, but may
put a cross at the left of the name of any candidate for whom
he wishes to vote": Laws S. Dak. 1893, c. 80, § 4.
"Tickets marked in a circle at the top with a cross showing
the intention of the voter to designate such ticket as his vote,
shall be counted throughout, except when a name is erased
with a lead pencil or otherwise, and a cross to the left of any
name on any other ticket shall be taken as a vote for such
person: Provided the name of the candidate for the same office
on the ticket marked at the top by the voter is erased, or it
otherwise appears that no other person has been voted for the
same office: " Laws S. Dak. 1893, c. 8o, § 6.
These instructions, which seem sufficiently clear and explicit,
are thus interpreted by the court:
"The elector may adopt either of four methods in designating the candidates for whom he desires to vote. First: He
may make a cross in the circle at the head of a party ticket, and
in this manner vote the entire party ticket. In such case that
ticket is full and complete and constitutes his ticket. Second:
He may make a cross in the circle at the head of the party ticket,
and may erase on that party ticket the names of the candidates
for whom he does not desire to vote, and not supply the place
of the erased name or names. He then votes the party ticket,
except as to the candidates whose names are erased, and as to
these the ticket is not filled. Third: When the elector has
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made a cross in the circle at the head of the party ticket, and
erased the name of one or more candidates thereon, he may
fill out his ticket in whole or in part by placing a cross to the
left of the names of candidates on other tickets, thus making
his ticket to consist of the names not erased upon his own
party ticket and the places of those erased filled by the name
or names of candidates on other tickets. Fourth: If the
elector chooses, he may omit the cross in the circle at the
head of any party ticket, and make up his ticket by placing
a cross to the left of the names of such candidates as he
desires to vote for upon any ticket on the ballot, the candidates
so voted for representing different offices on the ticket." The
opinion then states that as the statute has thuls declared the
effect of the marks, the courts cannot go beyond them in
order to ascertain the voter's intention; nor give effect to
that intention, if he has failed to substantially conform to the
provisions of the law.
According to these principles, it was decided (i) That a
cross at the head of the party ticket, but not within the circle,
is a nullity ; (2) That one or more circles within the circle at
the head of a party ticket do not constitute a cross witbin the
circle, and should be disregarded; (3) That a cross at the right
of a candidate's name is not a mere informality in the form of
marking, but is unauthorized and of no effect; (4) That a
straight diagonal line at the left of the name of a candidate is
not a cross, and cannot be considered; (5) That erasing a
name on a party ticket marked with a cross in the circle at
the head, and writing under it the name of the candidate for
the same office on another ticket, is unauthorized, and the
vote cannot be counted for the latter candidate; (to the same
effect is Parmley v. Healy, [Supreme Court of South Dakota],
64 N. W. Rep, 186;) (6) But that when the intention of the
elector to make a cross is clearly apparent, and the- cross is
made, whether with a stamp or otherwise, any mere informality in making it should be disregarded; (7) When a cross is
made in the circle at the bead of a party ticket, and no name
is erased thereon, it is to be counted throughout for the party
ticket, and no cross or mark opposite the name of any candi-
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date on any other ticket can be resorted to to defeat the
declared effect of the cross at the head of the ticket; (8) That
since the law has made no provision for a cross in the circle
at the head of more than one party ticket, crosses in the circles at the heads of two or more party tickets neutralize each
other, and the ballot must in such case be treated as if no cross
were made at the head of any party ticket; (9)That if the
attempted erasure of a candidate's name on a party ticket,
properly marked by a cross in the circle at the head thereof, is
such that it can be clearly seen that the voter has made an
effort to erase the name, and intended in fact to do so, any
informality in the mode of erasure should be disregarded; and
that an erasure can be made by blotting the name with a
cross or crosses by use of the official stamp, as well as by
drawing a line through it; (Io) That when an elector does
not make a cross in the circle at the head of any party ticket,
he may indicate candidates for whom he desires to vote by
placing a cross at the left of the candidate's name on any
ticket, and need not erase any name on the ballot. It was also
held that when the voter writes his own name on the ballot,
that ballot is marked so that it can be identified, and is void.
In Buckner v. LyniP, 41 Pac. Rep. 762, the Supreme Court
of Nevada has very sensibly ruled that, although the ballot
law of that state (Act, Nev. 1891, c. 40) provides (§ 24) that
"no ballot shall be deposited in the ballot box unless the
watermark, as hereinbefore provided, appears thereon, and
unless the slip containing the number of the ballot has been
removed therefrom by the inspector, and (§ 26) that "any
ballot upon which appears names, words, or marks written or
printed, except as in this act provided, shall not be counted,"
yet it is proper to count ballots from which the inspector,
through ignorance, failed to remove the slips bearing the
number, in spite of the fact that his failure to do so made the
voter's ballot capable of identification.
The same court has also held that a.mark which appears to
have been accidentally made, and not from an evil purpose,
should not be construed as a distinguishing mark, so as to
avoid the ballot. "Adopting this view, a ballot written by a
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hand unaccustomed to the use of a pencil, or awkwardness in
its use, or carelessness, or an apparent attempt to retrace a
clumsily made cross X, or an effort to make it more certain,
and in doing so employing more lines than are necessary to
properly make a cross, or a slightly blurred spot to correct a
mistake, not indicating an intention to identify the ballot, or a
slight erasure for the same purpose, or across made when the
ballot paper was defective, and to avoid the defect, and make
the vote more certain, a second cross was made, or a slight
pencil mark, clearly made by accident, and not design, or
a stain of tobacco, will not avoid the ballot .....
.But
blurred spots, plainly made by a lead pencil, which may have
been made for the purpose of cancelling a cross, but which
might have been made also for identification, or a cross not
opposite the name of any candidate, or two or more crosses
instead of one, or a number of crosses in a bunch, or a mark
not a cross, or the use of a blue lead pencil instead of a black
one, [as required by the act,] or a straight line, thus
over the word "No," or writing a word instead of employing
a cross, are grounds for rejecting the ballot: " Dennis v.
Caughlin, 41 Pac. Rep. 768.
In In re Garvaey, 41 N. E. Rep. 439, the Court of Appeals
of New York has re-asserted the principle laid down by it in
In re Goodman, 146 N. Y. 484; S. C., 40 N. E.
Voters,
Students
Rep. 769, that, under the Constitution of that
state, Art. 2, § 3, which provides that " For the purpose of
voting no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a
residence, by reason of his presence or absence .

. .

. while

a student of any seminary of learning," the intention to change
the legal residence must be shown by acts independent of a
person's presence as a student, in order to entitle him to vote
in the new locality; and applying this rule to the facts of the
particular cases before it, decided (i) That evidence that
a student coming to attend a seminary as a student notified
the registrar of the place of his former residence to strike his
name from the voting list, as he had changed his legal residence, and also notified the authorities of the seminary that he
had become a resident of the town in which it was situate, his
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object in so doing being to render himself eligible as a postulant, showed an intent to change his legal residence by acts
independent of his presence as a student; (2) That evidence
that a person went to a seminary as a student; that he engaged in the business of book-selling, and was also lay reader
in a church ; that he was not obliged and did not intend, to
leave the seminary after his course of study should be ended,
did not establish a legal residence in the town where the seminary is situated; and (3) That evidence that a person went to
a seminary as a student, and also as a teacher, and intended
to establish his residence at the seminary after his course of
study should be ended, was not sufficient to show a legal
residence in the seminary town.
In Mitchell v. Charleston Light & Power Co., 22 S. E. Rep767, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has enunciated
very interesting
principles in regard to the
ElectrlcWires, some vr
ne
Negligence,

liability of an electric company for damages due

to the breaking and falling of its wires, holding
(i) That an instruction that if a cyclone that could not be
anticipated was the cause of the falling of an electric wire, and,
if the defendant was not negligent in allowing it to remain
down for an unreasonable time, it would not be liable, is not
to be considered as misleading, on the ground that it allows
an inference that, if a cyclone which might have been anticipated was the cause, defendant was liable, though not negligent in allowing it to remain down an unreasonable time, when
the court has also charged that, if it was the act of God, it
could not be anticipated, and defendant would not be liable,.
but that, on the other hand, defendant was charged with the
duty of placing the wires so as to withstand ordinary weather,
and was liable if the accident was due to the fact that the
wires were improperly erected, or had been allowed to
remain on the ground an unusually long time after they were
broken down; (2) That such an instruction is not open to
the construction that defendant would be liable, though not
negligent, if the falling of the wire was caused by a class of
storm other than a cyclone, or by a storm of not quite the
Actus Del
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same degree of violence as a cyclone, when the word
" cyclone" was used because the witnesses had testified that
the day was '" cyclonic;" (3) That it is proper for the court
to refuse an instruction that, if the wire was broken by some
cause beyond the control of defendant, no blame could attach
to the defendant from the fact that it fell and remained lying
in the street, unless it was allowed to remain there "after
notice" for an unreasonable time; for the negligence of
defendant might have consisted in its failure to know the facts
connected with the breaking of the wire, it being bound to
use diligence to receive information as- to the condition of its
wires,
The Supreme Court of Texas has. recently decided a very
-interesting point of international law, holding, in Mexican Nat.
[nternational R* R. Co. v. Jackson, 32 S. W. Rep. 230, that as the
Law,
laws of Mexico, while making negligence result'Penal"
statutes,
Enforcement
in Foreign
Countries

ing in injury to another a penal offence, also give
-the injured person a right of action, civil in its
nature, the courts of Texas, by enforcing a right

of action for personal injuries caused by negligence which
accrued in Mexico, do not undertake to enforce a penal law of
al foreign country, and therefore do not contravene that principle of international law which forbids the enforcement of
such laws by countries other than that of their enactment.
There are probably few rules of. law less understood and of
more uncertain operation than this one. A general. confusion
of the technical sense of the word "penal" with its inexact
popular usage seems to be almost universal. Within the last
few years, the two highest judicial tribunals of the, world, the
Supreme Court of the United States and the judicial Committee of the -Privy Council, have united in condemning this
erroneous habit, and have attempted to clearly-define the limits.
of the rule. In Huntington v. Attrill [1893] App. Cas. 150,
the latter court, reversing the- decision of the Ontario Appeal
Court, 1.8 Ont., App. 136, which affirmed the decree of the
court below, 17 Ont. Rep. 245, held that an action to recover
a debt due by a corporation from a director thereof, under a
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statute (Laws N. Y. 1875, c. 61 I, § 21,) providing that "If
any certificate or report made, or public notice given, by the
officers of any such corporation, shall be false in any material
representation, all the officers who shall have signed the same
shall be jointly and 'severally liable for all the debts of the
corporation contracted while they are officers thereof," while
"penal" in the loose popular sense of the word, was not so in
its international sense, and could be maintained in a foreign
jurisdiction. The true doctrine is thus explained by Lord
Watson: "The rule has its foundation in the well-recognized
principle that crimes, including in that term all breaches of
public law punishable by pecuniary mulct or otherwise, at the
instance of the State Government, or of some one representing
the public, are local in this sense, that they are cognizable and
punishable in the country where they were committed. Accordingly no proceeding, even in the shape of a civil suit,
which has for its object the enforcement by the state, whether
directly or indirectly, of punishment imposed for such breaches
by the lexfori, ought to be admitted in the courts of any other
country.

.

.

.

actions,' which is so

The phrase 'penal

frequently used to designate that class of actions which, by the
law of nations, are exclusively assigned to their domestic
forum, does not afford an accurate definition. In its ordinary
acceptation, the word 'penal' may embrace penalties for
infractions of the general law which do not constitute offences
against the state; it may for many legal purposes be applied
with perfect propriety to penalties created by contract; and it
therefore, when taken by itself, fails to mark that distinction
between civil rights and criminal wrongs which is the very
essence of the international rule.

The expressions

...

'penal'

and 'penalty,' when employed without any qualification, express or implied, are calculated to mislead, because
they are capable of being construed so as to extend the rule
to all proceedings for the recovery of penalties, whether
exigible by the statute in the interest of the community, or by
private persons in their own interest.

.

.

.

A proceeding,

in order to come within the scope of the rule, must be in the
nature of a suit in favor of the state whose law has been
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infringed. All the provisions of municipal statutes for the
regulation of trade and trading companies are presumably
enacted in the interest and for the benefit of the community at
large; and persons who violate these provisions are, in a
certain sense, offenders against the state law, as well as against
individuals who may be injured by their misconduct. But
foreign tribunals do not regard these violations of statute law
as offences against the state, unless their vindication rests with
the state itself, or with the community which it represents.
Penalties may be attached to them, but that circumstance will
not bring them within the rule, except in cases where these
penalties are recoverable at the instance of the state, or of an
official duly authorized to prosecute in its behalf, or of a member of the public in the character of a common informer. An
action by the latter is regarded as an actio popiularis,pursued,
not in his individual interest, but in the interest of the whole
community."
This decision was followed, and its reasoning adopted, by
the Supreme Court of the United States, in Huntington v.
Attrill, 146 U. S, 657, reversing 70 Md. 191, and overruling
First Nat!. Bank v. Price, 33 Md. 487; Halsey v. McLean, 12
Allen, 438; Derrickson v. Smithl, 27 N. J. L. 166; and it
may now be considered to be the settled rule in such cases,
that no action will be regarded as penal in such a sense as to
forbid its maintenance in a foreign jurisdiction, unless it rests
upon an offence against the majesty of the state, and not
merely against the rights of a private individual; and that
even if the two exist side by side, the latter will be enforceable
in a foreign court, though the former will not.
In a recent case in the Queen's Bench Division, Stoddart v.
Sagar,[1895] 2 Q. B. 474, it was decided that the holding of
a coupon competition in a newspaper, which was
Lotteries,
Coupon
to be carried out by means of coupons, to be filled
Competition up by the purchasers of the
paper with the names
of the horses selected by the purchasers as likelyto come infirst,
second, third and fourth in a race, the purchaser to receive a
penny for every coupon filled up after the first, and a prize of
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-ioo being promised to any one who would name the first
four horses correctly, would not make the promoters of the
scheme liable either for opening and keeping an office to
exercise a lottery, for selling tickets and chances in a lottery,
or for publishing a proposal or scheme for the sale of tickets
and chances in a lottery, because the facts stated did not
amount to a lottery; nor for opening, keeping and using an
office for the purpose of money being received as the consideration for an undertaking to pay money on events and contingencies relating to horse-races, or for receiving moneys as
deposits on bets, or for publishing an advertisement inviting
all who read it to make bets and wagers on such events -and
contingencies.
The first distinctive feature of a lottery is, that it consists in
a distribution of prizes by lot or chance, without giving
those who participate in it an opportunity to win by the exercise of skill or judgment. If this factor is present, it does not
matter whether or not the prize to be won is disproportionate
to the price paid for joining in the scheme, whether any price
is paid or not, or whether there are blanks or not.
As an instance of a lottery scheme pure and simple, the case
of Davenortv.City of Ottawa, 54Kans. 7 11; S.C., 39 Pac. Rep.
7o8, will serve. The defendant in that case was a partner in
a firm which operated a large dry-goods store. The firm
placed in its window a locked box, with a glass front, containing twenty-five dollars in bills, and advertised that all persons
buying goods in their store, and paying for the same fifty
cents or over, would be-given a key; that one and only one
key which would unlock the box would be given out; and
that the person who received the key which would unlock the
box would be given the twenty-five dollars from it. The
defendant sold goods at the usual and ordinary prices, without
extra charge for the key, to various persons, for fifty cents and
over, and gave to each of the said persons a key, to which was
attached a card stating in substance the above offer. These
transactions were held to be in effect sales of merchandise and
lottery tickets for an aggregate price. Very similar to this
was the case of The State v. Mumford, 73 Mo. 647, where the
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proprietors of a newspaper issued to each subscriber to their
paper, in addition to the paper itself, and without extra charge,
a ticket which entitled the holder to participate in a distribution of prizes offered by the proprietors to all persons who
should become subscribers, which distribution was to be made
by lot. This, too, was held to be a lottery.
Another instance of a lottery device, in this case consisting
of chances secured by payment of a price therefor, is found in
the proceedings of the various bond investment companies,
which have but recently been broken up by the postal
authorities. The method adopted was to issue bonds at a
specified price, and to make the value of each bond dependent
upon its number, the bonds being numbered in the order in
which applications therefor reached the secretary of the company. This system of valuation was held to be so far
dependent on chance as to constitute a lottery: 3hzcDonald
v. United States, 63 Fed. Rep. 426.
1 Even if all those who participate in the scheme
draw a
prize of some sort, if the drawing is a matter of pure chance,
the device is a lottery, and the value of the prize, as compared
with the money paid, is immaterial. In Taylor v. Smetten, x I
Q. B. D. 207, the appellant sold packets of tea, each containing a coupon, entitling the purchaser to a prize. This
was publicly stated by the appellant before the sale, but the
purchasers did not know till after the sale what prize they
were entitled to receive. The prizes varied in character and
value, but the tea was good, and worth the money paid for it.
In spite of these facts, the transaction was held a lottery.
If, however, the scheme affords room for the exercise of
individual skill and judgment, so that the result does not
depend merely on chance, it is not a lottery. This would
seem to have been the ground of the decision in Stoddart v.
Sagar, supra, and in Caminada v. Hutton, 6o L. J. M. C.
x 6, which was very much like Stoddart v. Sagar in its facts.
But it is not so easy to reconcile with these cases that of Barclay v. Pearson, [893] 2 Ch. 154, the case of the "Missing
Word Competition." -In that case the defendant, who was
the proprietor of a newspaper, carried on in connection there-
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with a competition under the following conditions. He published in his paper a paragraph omitting the last word. In
the same paper he printed a coupon with a direction that
persons wishing to enter the competition must cut out the
coupon, fill in the word missing from the paragraph, together
with their names and addresses, and send it, with a postal
order for one shilling, to the office of the paper. It was
further stated in the paper that the missing word was in the
hands of a chartered accountant, enclosed in a sealed
envelope; that his statement with regard to it would appear,
together with the result of the competition, in a subsequent
issue of the paper; and that the whole of the money received
in entrance fees would be divided equally among those conipetitors who filled in the missing word correctly. This would
seem to have afforded a large field for the judgment of the
competitors; and yet it was held by STIRLING, J., to be a
lottery, so far at least as to prevent the successful competitors
from recovering the prize moneys from the defendant. The
judge put his decision upon the ground that the selection of the
word to be supplied rested on the arbitrary choice of the
defendant, and was therefore a matter of chance. But, granting the fact, it does not follow that the inference is correct;
for the "chance" which makes a scheme a lottery is not
chance in the selection of the criterion of distribution, but
chance in the distribution itself. If the criterion is unknown,
then the distribution is a matter of pure chance, and the
scheme is a lottery; but, if the criterion is known, and it lies
in the power of each competitor to shape his competitive
efforts with regard to that criterion, his individual judgment
comes into play, and the device is not a lottery. These criticisms, however, do not apply to the decision in the particular
case, but to the reasons given therefor, which seem to have
been too broadly stated. The true basis for holding that
competition a lottery is, that the missing word was selected in
such a manner that any one of a hundred different words
might fill the, gap equally well with that selected, and there
could therefore be no judgment exercised, but only mere
guesswork.
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Another essential element of a lottery device is, that the
participator should part with something of value in order to
obtain a right to participate in the distribution; and if this is not
the case, the scheme is not a lottery. Thus, in Cross v. Peo.,
18 Colo. 321, the defendants published the following advertisement:
"Given Away-D. K. Cross & Co., give away pianos to
advertise their shoe store, I 552 Larimer street, Denver, Colorado. Every customer receives our numbered business cards,
-or one will be sent to any address on receipt of stamp for postage, or given to each adult person registering their name at
our shoe store."
It was understood that the pianos were to be allotted by
.some method of chance; but the court held that it was not a
lottery, on the ground that no valuable consideration was
Tequired of the participators, as was clearly shown by the
advertisement.
A no&ie prosequi entered in a criminal prosecution constitutes a sufficient termination of the prosecution to authorize
the defendant to maintain an action for malicious
Malicious
prosecution, unless the record shows that the
Prosecution,
NlePros.
Nole pro.nolleprosequi was entered at his instance: Marcus
v. Bernstein, (Supreme Court of North Carolina,) 23 S. E.
Rep. 38, 1895.
The Supreme Court of Indiana has recently ruled, in City of
with
South Bend v. Martin, 41 N. E. Rep. 315, in accordance
the consensus of authority, that one who goes
Peddlers,
License,

from house to house .with articles of commerce,
offering them for sale, and delivering them as sold,
is engaged in peddling; and that an ordinance
prohibiting peddling without a license is not an interference
with interstate commerce, when it is sought to apply it to a
person who takes about with him chairs sent to him to sell as
agent, by a manufacturer in another state, and delivers them
at the time the sales are made; and that it is immaterial that
the sales are made on the instalment plan, and that the title
remains in the manufacturer until the full price is paid.
Intetate
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One who goes from house to house with rugs, leaving them
at a stipulated weekly payment, the title to pass to the partyrenting the rug when the whole amount of the rental is paid,
is a peddler, within an ordinance requiring peddlers to have a
license: Peo. v. Sawyer, (Supreme Court of Michigan), 64 N_
W. Rep. 333There is a brief note on the general question of the elements.
required to make one a peddler, in 2 Am. L. REG. & REV..
(N. S.) 569.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Nebraska, the amendment of a statute does not repeal it so
that a subsequent statute, which professes to
Statutes,
Amendment amend the original act, is invalid: State v. Bemis,
64 N. W. Rep. 348.
There is a full annotation on this subject in I Am. L. REG& REV. (N. S.) 566.
Judge KEKEWIcH, of the Chancery Division, has lately held
that registration of a design, under the English statutes, does
but only the
Trade Marks, not protect the idea of the designer,
actual design; and that therefore, when the plaintDesigns,
Infringement iff had registered a design consisting of a church
window of a particular style of architecture, with tracery
above and below, which they applied in metal work to the
sides of upright hexagonal oil stoves, and the defendants
adopting the plaintiff's idea, produced a design consisting of
a church window of a different style of architecture, with different tracery above and below, which they also applied in
metal work to the sides of hexagonal oil stoves, the latter
design could not be considered an infringement of the former,
as the two designs were essentially different: Harperv. Wrighf
& Butler Lamp Mfg. Co., Ltd., [1895] 2 Ch. 593.

